INTRODUCTION
Body Mass Index (BMI) is a widely used health quantity calculated as kд/m 2 . The world health organization categorizes BMI broadly into Underweight [0, 18.5), Normal [18. 5, 25) , Overweight [25, 30) , and Obese [30, +∞) [11] . Kocabey et al. recently developed a regression task Face-to-BMI [6] , where they accurately predicted BMI from images of human faces. The motivation for their study was identifying how an individual's BMI affects their treatment by others on social media platforms [7] .
In this paper we instead focus on the application of Face-to-BMI in the insurance industry, where adversarial attacks could become a issue. Suppose an insurance company uses a neural network to predict the BMI of their clients from photos and then uses this information to influence coverage. There are two scenarios in which an adversarial attacker may want to manipulate the input photo inperceptibly to attack the BMI predictor: (1) the attacker may want to make someone appear healthier to lower their rates; (2) conversely, make someone appear unhealthy to sabotage that person's insurance application. We demonstrate that a neural network performing Face-to-BMI is indeed vulnerable to test-time adversarial attacks. This extends test-time adversarial attacks from classification tasks (e.g. [2, 4, 9, 10] ) to regression.
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON FACE-TO-BMI PREDICTION
The victim neural network f : R 227×227×3 → R takes as input a 227 × 227 × 3 face image and outputs a BMI estimate.
We use Alexnet [8] layers conv1 to fc7 plus one linear layer after fc7 to perform regression.
The threat model assumes a whitebox attacker with full knowledge of the victim weights and architecture. The attacker can edit any pixels in the photo, including those not on the human. We consider targeted attacks to force f prediction into a pre-specified target range [L, U ] ⊂ R.
The attack formulation find the minimum perturbation δ such that for input input X , f (X + δ ) ∈ [L, U ]. Both X and X + δ must be valid images with integer pixel values in 0-255. We measure perturbation by its ℓ p norm ∥δ ∥ p for some p ∈ (0, ∞] [2, 4, 9, 10]. Thus, the ideal attack solves
However, this is a difficult integer program. We heuristically solve a related problem to simply find a small enough δ .
We reformulate the attack goal as follows:
. We relax the integral constraint on δ and change the objective:
We initialize δ = 0 and perform early-stopping as soon as f (X + Round(δ )) ∈ [L, U ] to encourage small norm on δ .
EXPERIMENTS
Datasets. We use two datasets of (photo, BMI) pairs: (1) Federal Corrections Body Mass Index (FCBMI) consists of 9045 public photos at multiple federal and state corrections facilities. (2) VisualBMI dataset with 4206 photos collected by [6] from Reddit. Training the victim network. We train the BMI prediction network with transfer-learning. We load weights pre-trained on the ILSVRC 2012 data set for the conv1 to fc7 layers of Alexnet. Then we randomly initialize the last linear layer using Xavier [3] . Finally we fine tune the entire network's weights using our own training images. We use a random subset of 7000 images in FCBMI for fine-tuning, and keep the remaining 2045 images in FCBMI and the whole VisualBMI for testing. We pre-process the images identically to in AlexNet [8] The attacker freezes the weights of the entire network except δ and trains the network using projected gradient descent on the objective in (2). Once training is complete, the attacker takes a final projection step and rounds δ so that (X + δ ) ∈ I .
Algorithm 1 Adversarially attacking the BMI prediction network

Input:
f : BMI prediction network, X : victim image,
{rounds δ such that X + δ is moved to the nearest point in I } return δ {flags a failure if final δ is unsuccessful after K iterations}
Qualitative results. Figure 1 shows the BMI attack on 8 photos from the VisualBMI data set. We obscured the eyes with black boxes to preserve partial anonymity of those pictured. The boxes are not present in the original data set, so neither the prediction network nor the attacker saw or were influenced by them. Figure 2 (left) shows BMI before and after attack on VisualBMI. One may expect the attack to just project the predicted BMI onto the boundary of the target range. We see almost exactly that, but there is some minor variance within the target region due to rounding of δ . Infrequently, there are large outliers where the rounding shifts the prediction to the other side of the target range. One example of this phenomenon is the right-most face in Figure 1 . Figure 2 (right) shows ∥δ ∥ 2 under both attacks. As expected, the further a victim's initially predicted BMI from the target region, the larger the norm of the perturbation δ . Figure 3 shows ∥δ ∥ ∞ on the FCBMI test set. The same trend holds. Also note the maximum pixel value change is small, roughly 5 out of 255. These attacks will be difficult for humans to perceive.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have demonstrated that naïve whitebox adversarial attacks can be a threat to Face-to-BMI regression. For this reason, we urge caution when using BMI predicted from images in applications such as insurance, as they can be manipulated to make someone's rates artificially lower or higher.
The attacks in this paper requires the ability to modify any pixels. A more realistic attack would be physical, e.g.
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